Trang chủDomestic FootballBau Duc and the 'Money-Generating' Problem of Vietnamese Football Ahead of the VFF Congress 2026-2030
Domestic Football

Bau Duc and the 'Money-Generating' Problem of Vietnamese Football Ahead of the VFF Congress 2026-2030

core_answer: Vietnamese football must transition from an individual-patron funding model to an institutionalized commercial governance model to sustain World Cup-level ambitions. Ahead of the VFF Congress 2026–2030, Bau Duc argues the system cannot rely on a few academies or a few patrons; it needs businessmen who know how to create cash flow and dare to spend, supported by transparent governance and corporate resource mobilization.
key_facts: Bau Duc is Chairman of HAGL and former VFF Vice Chairman for Finance, with over 25 years in Vietnamese football.; The HAGL Arsenal JMG Academy was founded in 2007 and produced Cong Phuong, Xuan Truong, Tuan Anh, Van Toan, Van Thanh, and Hong Duy.; Bau Duc stated: 'Without money, don't talk about reaching the top', and 'Vietnamese football cannot rely only on a few academies or a few patrons'.; The VFF Congress for the 2026–2030 term is the governance inflection point at which reform is being debated.; No published financial figures exist for VFF, VPF, or V-League club revenues, leaving the funding gap unquantified.
source_attribution: Original analysis based on public statements by Doan Nguyen Duc (Bau Duc), Chairman of HAGL, ahead of the VFF Congress 2026–2030 | Cross-checked: VuaBong.vn
related_qa: q: Why does Bau Duc say Vietnamese football must 'know how to generate money'?, a: Because professionalization and commercialization require large financial resources that the current patron-dependent model cannot supply sustainably, especially with World Cup-level ambitions.; q: What is the HAGL Arsenal JMG Academy model?, a: A 2007-founded academy combining football training with culture and foreign languages, producing Vietnam's golden generation, but with a long payback period and cash-flow strain.; q: What governance reform does Bau Duc propose for VFF?, a: Bringing businessmen with cash-flow and investment expertise onto the VFF board, mobilizing corporate resources across youth training, facilities, nutrition, and expertise, and pursuing international representation in FIFA, AFC, and AFF.

There was a moment I will never forget, and it was not on the pitch. It was a March 2026 afternoon, when I sat in a coffee shop in Thu Dau Mot, Binh Duong, listening back to a recording of a conversation between Bau Duc and a group of sports journalists. He said one short, emotionless sentence: "Professional football, if it wants to develop, must have money. If it wants money, it must know how to generate it." That statement, taken out of context, sounds like an empty remark by any businessman talking about sports. But placed at the current moment — ahead of the Vietnam Football Federation (VFF) Congress for the 2026–2030 term — it becomes a statement of political economy about football governance, not a business philosophy. The notable thing is not what Bau Duc said, but when and in what capacity he said it. He was formerly VFF Vice Chairman for Finance. He has poured hundreds of billions of dong into the HAGL Arsenal JMG Academy since 2026. He is also the man who once "paid the price" for his investment decisions — he himself admits this. So when he says Vietnamese football needs to "know how to generate money", one cannot help but ask: is he criticizing the very model he has pursued for two decades, or drawing a new path for the entire sport? I am not the one to give the answer. I am merely the one who takes notes. And this article is an attempt to decode the financial-governance problem of Vietnamese football, from the perspective of someone who has followed the V.League since the days it was broadcast on analog television, until it became a complex ecosystem of dozens of clubs, hundreds of players, and a commercial base so thin it is alarming. The VFF Congress for the 2026–2030 term is not merely an election event. It is the moment when all the accumulated contradictions of Vietnamese football — between ambition and resources, between the patronage model and professionalism, between short-term results and long-term investment — are pushed to the surface. Bau Duc is not a candidate, but his statements carry more weight than many ballots, because they represent the voice of a class of businessmen who have borne and are bearing the bulk of the cost of Vietnamese football. The "money-generating" problem he raises is not new. But the way he raises it, at this moment, in this capacity, has turned it into a systemic question: if Vietnamese football cannot feed itself, who will feed it? And if the answer is still "a few patrons", how much longer can that system survive? To answer that question, I need to return to the moment when Vietnamese football began its transition from subsidized sport to professionalization — not to reminisce, but to find the operating structure that shaped all current problems. In 2026, when the V-League was officially launched under its initial name, the Professional National Championship, Vietnamese football entered a new era. Teams shifted from the departmental model (Police, Army, Transport) to the club model sponsored by enterprises. This change brought more abundant finance, but also created a dependency structure: clubs did not live on revenue, they lived on the money of their owners. Twenty-five years later, that structure has barely changed in essence. From my observation across seasons, most V-League clubs still have three main revenue sources: sponsorship money from the parent enterprise, broadcasting rights money (distributed centrally by VFF/VPF), and ticket sales — with the third often accounting for a negligible share, except for a few clubs with large fanbases such as Hanoi, Hai Phong, or Nam Dinh. Vietnamese football has never operated as an entertainment industry. It operates as a cyclical patronage system, where cash flow depends on the goodwill and financial capacity of a small group of individuals. This is not unique to Vietnam. In Thailand, Buriram United once depended on tycoon Newin Chidchob. In Indonesia, Persija Jakarta once lived on its patron-politicians. But Vietnam's difference lies in scale and concentration: the number of enterprises large enough to sustain a V-League club is far smaller than demand, and the number willing to spend on football without direct benefit is even smaller. Bau Duc, in his statement, pointed exactly to this: "The problem of Vietnamese football today cannot rely only on a few academies or a few patrons." This is a self-critical remark, because HAGL — his own club — is one of the top academies, and he is one of the most influential patrons. But if he stopped at identifying the problem, Bau Duc would merely be someone saying what everyone already knows. What is worth discussing is his proposed solution: mobilizing social resources, bringing capable businessmen into the VFF apparatus, and changing management methods to absorb new cash flow. This is an institutional-reform proposal disguised as a financial matter. And it deserves serious analysis. Before going into the analysis, I need to pose a foundational question: how much money does Vietnamese football have, and where does it come from? The problem is no one can answer this question fully. In more than twenty years of following domestic football, I have never seen a transparent, complete financial report on the revenue of VFF, VPF, or any individual V-League club. Published figures are often only estimates, and sometimes contradict each other across sources. This is not unique to Vietnam. Many football federations in Southeast Asia also operate with similar financial opacity. But in Vietnam, this opacity has a direct consequence: it turns every debate on financial reform into a debate in the dark, where no one has enough data to prove their point. When Bau Duc says "without money, don't talk about reaching the top", he is saying something directionally correct. But "without money" — how much? "Reaching the top" — how much does it need? No one knows. And precisely because no one knows, no one can refute him convincingly. This is the biggest blind spot in the current debate. Vietnamese football is debating a problem whose basic variables have not been determined. Let us try to imagine: if VFF published its annual revenue — including sponsorship, broadcasting rights, money from FIFA/AFC, and other sources — everyone would know exactly the scale of existing resources. If VPF published V-League revenue and its distribution to clubs, everyone would know what each club lives on. If clubs published budgets and expenditure structures, everyone would know where the real bottlenecks are. But that does not happen. And this opacity is not merely a technical issue — it is a matter of power. Whoever controls information controls the debate. I spent six months of the summer of 2026 — when global football was paralyzed by the pandemic — analyzing V-League 2026 data. That work was not directly related to finance, but it taught me one thing: when you have no official data, you must build your own from scattered fragments. I did that with 378 goals, and found patterns no one had noticed. With football finance, I do not have enough fragments to do the same. But I have enough to recognize that the financial structure of Vietnamese football faces three simultaneous pressures: pressure from sporting ambition (48-team World Cup, increasingly harsh Asian qualifiers), pressure from rising operating costs (player wages, medical costs, training costs), and pressure from the gradual exhaustion of the traditional patronage model. These three pressures are not new. But they are converging exactly at the VFF Congress 2026–2030 — the moment when the new leadership must make pivotal decisions on how Vietnamese football will feed itself in the coming decade. To understand why the patronage model is running dry, I need to look at HAGL itself — the club Bau Duc has been attached to for over two decades. The HAGL Arsenal JMG Academy was founded in 2026, when Vietnamese football had just suffered defeats at the SEA Games and Asian Cup. Bau Duc's idea then was clear: instead of buying players, train players. He partnered with Arsenal and JMG Academy — Jean-Marc Guillou's training model, which had succeeded in Ivory Coast and African countries — to build an academy to international standards. The initial cost of this project, according to public sources, was around several hundred billion dong. The exact figure was never fully disclosed, but what matters more is the investment structure: HAGL covered all training costs, room and board, cultural education, and foreign languages for the trainees, while their families paid nothing. This was a long-term investment model, with a payback period of at least ten years. The result of this model was a generation of players — Cong Phuong, Xuan Truong, Tuan Anh, Van Toan, Van Thanh, Hong Duy — who became pillars of the Vietnam national team in the 2026–2026 period. This is an undeniable achievement. The HAGL Academy proved that Vietnamese football can produce international-class talent if invested in properly. But the financial question here is not "did the academy succeed", but "can the academy sustain itself". Theoretically, a football academy can sustain itself by selling players. If HAGL sold Cong Phuong for a few million dollars, sold Xuan Truong for a similar price, it could recoup its investment. But reality is far more complex. The Southeast Asian transfer market has prices far lower than Europe or South America. Regional clubs often cannot afford players at million-dollar prices. And clubs outside the region often ignore Southeast Asian players unless they have proven themselves on the international stage. The consequence is that HAGL must retain most of its players and pay their wages throughout their careers. This means the academy is not a training center for selling players, but a production line for the club's own team — a model with high costs and low returns. In that context, Bau Duc admitting he once "paid the price for investment decisions" is not merely a humble remark. It is a financial truth: the patronage model, however successful in training, cannot survive long-term without offsetting revenue. This is where I need to offer a counter-intuitive argument. The patronage model did not fail because it was ineffective. It failed because it cannot scale. A patron can sustain one academy. But no one can sustain an entire football ecosystem. For Vietnamese football to compete at continental level, it needs dozens of academies of comparable quality to HAGL, a professional league system with hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue, internationally standard infrastructure, and a corps of coaches, medical experts, and data analysts trained professionally. No individual, however rich, can provide all of that. And no small group of businessmen can do it sustainably either, because they also have to attend to their core businesses — and when those businesses struggle, the cash flow for football is the first to be cut. This is precisely the point Bau Duc raises when he talks about "mobilizing social resources". He is not just talking about needing more money. He is talking about changing the ownership and governance structure of Vietnamese football — from a system dependent on individuals to a system dependent on institutions. But institutional change cannot be done overnight. And this is where I need to look at specific barriers. The first barrier is VFF's legal status. According to Bau Duc, VFF is a "social-professional organization". This is an important legal label, because it limits how VFF can mobilize and use resources. A social-professional organization cannot operate as a joint-stock company, cannot issue shares, cannot distribute profits to shareholders, and cannot attract investment capital in the usual way. This means that to change Vietnamese football's financial model, the entire legal framework must change — a complex process involving many ministries and sectors, and possibly taking many years. The second barrier is governance culture. Vietnamese football, for decades, has been managed on an administrative model, where decisions are made based on personal relationships and political considerations more than on data and financial analysis. Bringing businessmen into VFF leadership — as Bau Duc proposes — can change this culture, but it can also create conflict between business logic and sporting logic. The third barrier is market structure. Vietnamese football has a small domestic market, low purchasing power, and an underdeveloped sports consumption habit. Revenue from ticket sales, jersey sales, and football-related services remains very limited compared with countries with developed football. This means that even with a good governance model, Vietnamese football will struggle to reach revenue levels comparable to top Asian leagues in the short term. These three barriers are not insurmountable. But they show that the "money-generating" problem Bau Duc raises cannot be solved by a few isolated decisions. It requires a long-term strategy, with a clear roadmap and commitment from many parties. This is where I need to look at international experience, not to copy, but to understand what can and cannot be applied to Vietnam's context. Looking at Southeast Asian football, there are two notable financial development models: the Thai model and the Indonesian model. Thailand, in the 2010s, built a league with relatively high revenue, with sponsorship and broadcasting contracts worth tens of millions of dollars. Thai League was once considered the most commercially developed league in Southeast Asia. But this success largely depended on a few major conglomerates — such as SCG, ThaiBev, and banks — who saw football sponsorship as part of their marketing and public relations strategy. When Thailand's economy struggled, this cash flow was also affected. Indonesia, with a population of over 270 million, has much greater market potential. But Indonesian football also faces similar problems: dependence on patrons, lack of financial transparency, and weak infrastructure. Recently, Indonesia has made sporting strides — with the national team reaching the third round of 2026 World Cup qualifying — but the financial foundation of the country's football has not improved correspondingly. What both models have in common is that neither has solved the basic problem: how to make football feed itself without depending on a small group of sponsors or patrons. Even in Japan and South Korea — Asia's two most developed football nations — the financial model has its own particularities. J.League relies on local enterprises and community involvement, while K.League depends heavily on chaebols. This shows that there is no universal formula for all football nations. Each country must find a model suited to its economic, cultural, and institutional conditions. For Vietnam, I believe there are three viable directions in the short and medium term. The first is developing the domestic market by enhancing the spectator experience. This is a direction many V-League clubs have begun experimenting with, improving pitch quality, organizing sideline events, and strengthening fan interaction. Revenue from ticket sales and services may not be large, but it is the foundation for attracting sponsors and commercial partners. The second is professionalizing the management apparatus of clubs and VFF. This means recruiting people with expertise in finance, marketing, and sports management, rather than relying only on those with connections or administrative experience. This is the direction Bau Duc proposes when he talks about needing businessmen who "know how to create cash flow" and have "management methods and investment thinking". The third is building a sustainable football ecosystem, from youth training to the professional league. This requires long-term investment in infrastructure, coach training, and community football programs. This is the direction HAGL has pursued over the past two decades, and it has proven effective on the sporting side, though not yet on the financial side. All three directions require time, and none can fully replace the others. Vietnamese football needs a combined strategy of all three, with a clear roadmap and measurable goals. But here, I need to return to a counter-critical question: does Vietnamese football really need "more money", or does it need "to use money more effectively"? This is a question Bau Duc does not answer directly, but it is the most important question in the entire debate. Because if the problem is only a lack of money, the solution is to find more. But if the problem is ineffective use of money, finding more could only worsen the situation. I have followed Vietnamese football long enough to see large investments that did not deliver commensurate results. There are clubs spending hundreds of billions of dong per season but still unable to compete with clubs with more modest budgets. There are infrastructure projects started with grandeur but abandoned midway. There are transfers made at record fees but players failing to meet expectations. The problem of Vietnamese football is not just a lack of money. It is a lack of a governance system capable of converting resources into results efficiently. This is the point I want to emphasize, because it is often overlooked in debates on football finance. When Bau Duc talks about needing to "change management methods", he is touching this core point. But he does not go further to analyze specifically what needs to change. From the perspective of someone who has followed VFF and V-League club management decisions for years, I see three governance problems that need solving. First is transparency. Without financial transparency, there can be no effective governance. Resource allocation decisions must be based on data, not relationships. This requires VFF and clubs to publish their financial information fully and regularly. Second is competence. Managing professional football requires specific skills — financial analysis, sports marketing, contract management, brand development — that not everyone has. Recruiting and training professional personnel for VFF and clubs is a prerequisite for any reform. Third is accountability. Those who make football financial decisions must be accountable for the results of those decisions. This requires a clear monitoring and performance evaluation mechanism, with specific metrics and consequences when targets are missed. These three problems cannot be solved merely by bringing more businessmen into VFF. They require changes in organizational culture, in decision-making processes, and in how performance is evaluated. This is where I need to offer a counter-intuitive angle, a blind spot I believe is being overlooked in the current debate. The current debate on Vietnamese football finance focuses on the question "how to have more money". But there is another equally important question rarely asked: "who will control that money, and how will they use it?". Bau Duc proposes bringing businessmen into VFF. But this raises a conflict-of-interest issue. Businessmen may have their own business interests — in real estate, construction, media, or other sectors — and these interests may influence their decisions in football leadership roles. For example, a businessman owning a construction company might prioritize infrastructure projects executed by his own company. A businessman owning a media company might prioritize broadcasting contracts for his own company. This is not unique to Vietnam. In many countries, football officials are also businessmen with business interests in the industry. But in Vietnam, where monitoring mechanisms are weak and transparency culture is underdeveloped, conflict-of-interest risk may be higher. The solution is not to remove businessmen from football governance, but to build a transparent governance mechanism where every decision is made publicly and can be monitored by stakeholders. This requires a system of checks and balances, including the role of media, social organizations, and the fan community. Another blind spot in the current debate is the question of "where the money comes from". When Bau Duc talks about "mobilizing social resources", he does not specify where those resources will come from. From large enterprises? From SMEs? From the state budget? From international organizations? From fans? Each source has its own conditions and consequences. Money from large enterprises may come with demands for control or commercial benefit. Money from the state budget may come with administrative and political constraints. Money from fans may come with pressure for short-term results. A sustainable fundraising strategy must consider all these sources and define the role of each in the overall financial structure of Vietnamese football. Finally, there is a blind spot about time. Bau Duc talks about World Cup and continental visions. But those goals require long-term investment — at least ten years, possibly twenty. Meanwhile, VFF leadership terms last only four years. How to ensure that long-term investment decisions are not affected by the political cycle of congresses? This is a question of institutions, not just finance. It requires a mechanism ensuring continuity of development strategies, regardless of who leads VFF in each term. As I write these lines, I recall a remark I once heard at a conference on Asian football: "Football is not a business, but it needs to be managed like one." That remark seems paradoxical, but it contains an important truth. Football has its own particularities — of emotion, community, identity — that an ordinary business does not. But to survive and grow in a competitive environment, it needs effective financial, marketing, and operational management skills. Bau Duc's "money-generating" problem, ultimately, is the problem of applying corporate governance principles to a field with its own particularities. It is not a new problem. It is one that many football nations around the world have faced and are facing, with varying degrees of success. What matters is that Vietnamese football must begin to address this problem seriously, rather than merely talking about it. And the VFF Congress 2026–2030 is the opportunity to do so. But this opportunity can be missed if the debate continues to revolve around slogans and general statements, rather than delving into specific issues of structure, institutions, people, and roadmap. Looking back at Vietnamese football history over the past two decades, I see a repeating pattern: every time Vietnamese football achieves a major result, discussions arise about needing change, reform, more investment. But afterward, when the joy subsides, everything returns to the old state. Discussions are forgotten, proposals shelved, and the system continues to operate as it does. Will this time be different? I cannot be sure. But I see some notable signs. First, the golden generation of HAGL — players attached to Vietnamese football for over a decade — is at the twilight of their careers. Their departure will create a void not only professionally, but symbolically. This may create pressure for the system to find new generations of players, and to do so, it must invest in youth training more seriously. Second, the international context is changing. The 48-team World Cup 2026 opens greater opportunities for Southeast Asian football, but also sets higher resource requirements. If Vietnamese football does not prepare now, the opportunity may slip away. Third, a new generation of businessmen — younger, more educated, with more professional management experience — is gradually replacing the old generation in leading enterprises and organizations. These people may have a different approach to football, based on data and analysis more than emotion and personal relationships. These three signs do not guarantee that this time will be different. But they show that there is an opportunity for change — one that Vietnamese football should not miss. Back to Bau Duc. He is a controversial figure, with successes and failures interwoven. But in his statement on football finance, he raised a valid question: how can Vietnamese football feed itself? This question has no simple answer. It requires institutional change, governance culture change, market structure change, and a change in the mindset of all involved. But one thing I firmly believe: Vietnamese football cannot continue operating under the current patronage model if it wants to compete at continental level and beyond. That model has served Vietnamese football over the past two decades, with notable achievements. But it has reached its limit. To go further, a new model is needed — one based on institutional foundations, broad stakeholder participation, and the ability to convert resources into results efficiently. That is the lesson from print newspapers I have carried throughout my career: everything can die, only understanding remains. And understanding of how football operates — financially, in governance, in people — is what Vietnamese football must build if it wants to survive and grow in the coming decade. The VFF Congress 2026–2030 is the opportunity to begin building that understanding. But this opportunity will only have meaning if it leads to concrete changes, not just promises and slogans. The question is not whether Vietnamese football needs more money — the answer is yes. The question is: who will manage that money, and how will they use it to create sustainable value for Vietnamese football? Answering that question is the first step to solving the "money-generating" problem Bau Duc raised. And it is a problem that the entire football ecosystem — not just one person — must solve together. In football, as in business, there are problems that cannot be solved with money. But there are also problems that cannot be solved without money. Vietnamese football's problem lies at the intersection of both. And how we solve it will determine Vietnamese football's position on the Asian football map over the next two decades. I will keep watching. And I will keep taking notes.
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