Nguyen Duc Thuy and the 600–1,000 Billion VND Plan: Vietnamese Football's Equation Without a Denominator
Trả lời cốt lõi: Ông Nguyễn Đức Thụy đề xuất huy động 600 đến 1.000 tỷ đồng mỗi năm cho bóng đá Việt Nam từ năm 2027 theo cơ chế xã hội hóa 100%, đồng thời chuyển khoảng 80 tỷ đồng ngân sách nhà nước sang thể thao Olympic và ASIAD. Sự kiện chính: - Mục tiêu 600 đến 1.000 tỷ đồng/năm (khoảng 23,5 đến 39,2 triệu USD), khởi động từ năm 2027. - Ngân sách nhà nước cho bóng đá khoảng 80 tỷ đồng/năm (khoảng 3
In a conference hall in Hanoi, a projector screen lit up with a line that had a dash in the middle: 600 – 1,000 billion VND.
No player walked onto a pitch. No whistle blew. Yet this was the biggest match of Vietnamese football in 2026, and the score would be counted in dong rather than goals.
Nguyen Duc Thuy presented his programme to the congress: mobilise 600 to 1,000 billion VND per year for Vietnamese football, starting in 2027, operating on a fully socialised funding model. The state budget allocation for football, roughly 80 billion VND per year, would be redirected to sports targeting the Olympics and the Asian Games.
I read the 600 – 1,000 line three times. The first time I saw ambition. The second time I saw a gap. The third time I opened my calculator.
Three calculations jumped out immediately. The distance between 600 and 1,000 is 67 percent, a spread far too wide for any financial plan built from the bottom up. The 80 billion VND being released is money that cannot be recovered. And the programme has already committed 3 billion VND per V.League club, 2 billion per First Division club, and 2 billion per women's club, each season.
Then I counted the document again. Of its 35 information points, around ten are financial targets. Not one is a baseline.
That is why I sat down to write. I do not write analysis pieces, I open an autopsy nobody dares to hold the knife for.
A FEDERATION LOOKING FOR ITS FOOTING
Vietnamese football entered 2026 in what I call a legitimacy-refresh phase. The 2026–2030 term of the Vietnam Football Federation opened after a national-team cycle whose results generated no commercial aftershock, and after a long stretch in which the biggest question in domestic football was always where the money comes from to feed the system.
The congress is the one moment in the year when financial numbers are spoken aloud. Normally they sit in internal reports, in sponsorship contracts with confidentiality clauses, in meetings with no public minutes. The congress turns them into public discourse, and public discourse must withstand scrutiny.
Nguyen Duc Thuy arrived with a programme that has a clear structure: five revenue lines covering socialised funding, corporate sponsorship, media rights, digital content, and football services. A target of 600 to 1,000 billion VND per year, equivalent to roughly 23.5 to 39.2 million USD at a reference rate of 25,500 VND to the dollar. A roadmap starting in 2027.
Attached to it is a statement that marks a turning point: football will no longer depend on the state budget. Around 80 billion VND per year, roughly 3.1 million USD, will be redirected to sports capable of winning Olympic and Asian Games medals.
The programme also commits to raising federation staff payroll by two to three times from 2027, subsidising clubs at the rates above, and supporting 2 to 3 billion VND for each qualified local federation, out of 63 provinces and cities.
On competition structure, the programme sets out an option to expand the V.League from 14 to 16–18 teams, and the First Division to 18–20 teams. The document states explicitly that this is an option requiring further study, not a decision.
And there is one element I consider the strongest part of the entire programme: a commitment to audit by one of the Big Four accounting firms, alongside a supervision mechanism involving member organisations.
The sponsorship backdrop is also named. Corporate groups linked to Vingroup, to SHB, to HAGL and THACO, and to ThaiGroup appear among the resources mentioned. Four groups, no more.
That is the whole picture. A federation needs money, a candidate supplies a number, and a control mechanism comes along with it.
The rest of this piece is where I put that number on the scales.
THE MINUTES PROBLEM: FROM 182 TO 240 MATCHES
I have followed the V.League since before I sat in a studio. Based on my experience tracking matches across many seasons, the problem in Vietnamese football has never been a shortage of trained players. The problem is that those players reach 19, 20, 21 and have no high-pressure minutes.
Thuy diagnoses exactly this point. It is the strongest technical element of the programme, and I acknowledge it seriously.
But the diagnosis is sharper than the prescription. The prescription is more teams.
Do the arithmetic. A 14-team double round-robin league has 26 rounds, meaning 182 matches. A 16-team league has 30 rounds, meaning 240 matches. A difference of 58 matches. Each match contains 22 starting places times 90 minutes, or 1,980 player-minutes. Multiplied out, the expanded league creates roughly 114,840 additional top-flight player-minutes per season.
That number looks beautiful. And it is precisely why I have to say what comes next.
Those additional minutes do not automatically flow to 21-year-old feet. Without a youth registration clause, without a homegrown-minutes rule, the 58 new matches will be filled by exactly the people filling the 182 old ones: mid-tier foreign players and veteran domestic players. Four new clubs, each needing around 25 to 28 players, means 100 to 112 squad places. How many of those are under-23? The document does not answer.
This is where I see the difference between a programme and a slogan. Indonesia once tackled the same problem with a youth registration quota, a blunt but measurable mechanism. Thailand chose to expand its league and let the market sort it out. Vietnam is choosing Thailand's route without Thailand's academy base.
And there is a constraint the programme leaves entirely blank: time. A 16-team league with 30 rounds, plus FIFA windows, plus the ASEAN Championship, plus the SEA Games, plus AFC club competition slots, pushes fixture density to a level where squads without depth must rotate by playing youngsters… or by playing badly. Expanding the league without simultaneously expanding squad depth produces more matches at lower quality, and I have seen that script play out in many places.
There is one more technical detail few notice. Going from 14 to 16–18 teams is not a demand decision. It is a supply decision. Vietnam needs two to four additional clubs meeting AFC-linked licensing criteria, meaning a stadium, an academy, and financial reporting that qualifies. The number of clubs currently meeting those criteria is not large. If expansion happens by lowering the bar, we get more matches and more problems.
THE FOREIGN-PLAYER BLANK: THE BIGGEST DECISION LEFT EMPTY
In the entire programme there is exactly one sentence that admits a real contradiction. Thuy says that high-quality foreign players make the league more competitive, but at the same time take opportunities away from Vietnamese players.
That is the most honest sentence in the document. And immediately after it, the document goes silent.
No foreign-player quota. No age-based rule. No transition schedule. No mandatory youth registration in matchday squads.
I will say it plainly: this is the most consequential technical decision in the entire programme, and it is left blank. Everything else, from the number of teams to the subsidy levels, is downstream of it.
Imagine two scenarios. Scenario A: the V.League goes to 18 teams, no youth quota, and the new clubs buy cheap foreign players from Africa and South America to survive. The result is that 114,840 new minutes are allocated to people who cannot play for the national team. Scenario B: the V.League goes to 18 teams, and every club must register at least three under-21 players in each matchday squad. The result is the same volume of minutes, flowing where it needs to flow.
The cost of the two scenarios is nearly identical. The outcome differs by a generation of players.
I understand why sports politicians avoid this decision. A foreign-player quota upsets the big clubs, who have money and voice. A youth-minutes rule upsets coaches, who are judged on immediate results rather than on development output.
But that is exactly why a federation exists. If a federation only does the easy things, it is a tournament organiser, not a governing body.
THE COST TEST: 245 TO 330 BILLION VND COMMITTED BEFORE A BALL IS KICKED
This is the part that made me reach for the calculator.
The programme commits to specific outlays. I reconstructed the whole thing on central assumptions, and I flag clearly which are assumptions.
V.League subsidies: 3 billion VND per club, 48 billion at 16 teams, 54 billion at 18. First Division subsidies: 2 billion per club, 36 to 40 billion at 18–20 teams. Women's football subsidies: 2 billion per club, 14 to 16 billion at 7–8 teams. Local federation support: 2 to 3 billion per unit, 40 to 60 billion across roughly 20 qualifying units out of 63. Federation payroll increase of two to three times: estimated at 15 to 50 billion, depending on the current base. Futsal, beach football, school football: listed as appropriate levels, estimated at 10 to 30 billion.
The total of these commitments lands at roughly 165 to 250 billion VND per year.
Then add the 80 billion VND of state budget being released. Because once the state redirects that line, football must cover the shortfall from socialised funding. Total pre-committed spending is therefore around 245 to 330 billion VND per year.
Against the 600 billion target, that is 41 to 55 percent. Against the 1,000 billion target, it is 25 to 33 percent.
In other words: a quarter to a half of the money raised is spent before a single dong reaches a pitch, sports medicine, a youth academy, or an international tournament bid.
I am not opposed to club subsidies. I am opposed to calling them development investment.
Look at the 3 billion VND per V.League club, roughly 118,000 USD. Annual V.League club budgets are commonly cited in the 40 to 200 billion VND range, depending on the club and the source. That puts the subsidy at around 3 to 7 percent of a club budget. For many clubs it is close to one month of the wage bill.
One month of wages does not change a club's structure. It changes a club's attitude in a vote.
I call this subsidy a disguised transfer deal. The transfer market does not sell players, it sells promises that have never been tested. Here, what is being sold is a seat at a congress, and the price is listed publicly at 2 to 3 billion VND per unit.
THE HIDDEN DENOMINATOR: WHERE DOES 600 BILLION COME FROM
This is the question any serious financial plan must answer first, and the only question this document completely avoids.
What is the Vietnam Football Federation's current revenue?
I dug. In 2026 I was orphaned by football, so I started excavating old numbers. The habit stayed. And what I found here is a deliberate void: public sources describe federation revenue only in the low hundreds of billions of VND, with no official figure published alongside an audited report.
A decent plan needs four columns: current revenue, contracted revenue, pipeline revenue, and revenue from new categories. This document has only the fourth column, and the fourth column is written in the future tense.
The gap between 600 and 1,000 billion VND is 400 billion, or 67 percent. In corporate finance, a plan with a 67 percent spread between low and high scenarios is usually a plan with no model. It is a confidence interval drawn by feel.
On the revenue lines, I have two observations.
First, media rights and digital content are the two weakest legs. In Vietnam, rights are fragmented between the federation, which holds the national team, and the professional football joint-stock company, which holds the top league. The two have different interests. Add widespread piracy and a very strong free-to-air viewing culture. A plan that bets on digital content without naming a mechanism is a line of text, not a line of revenue.
Second, large Vietnamese corporates tend to prefer named, visible sponsorship: stadium naming, national-team kit, tournament title. They are less inclined to hand unrestricted cash to a federation. That means realised revenue may skew toward restricted funds, and restricted funds cannot pay for the club subsidy programme.
Put those two together and you get a very realistic scenario: the federation raises 600 billion VND, 400 billion of it is locked into named projects, and the 165 to 250 billion VND subsidy commitment has no funding source.
THE 80 BILLION RATCHET
The 80 billion VND of state budget is the part I want to spend the most words on, because it is the irreversible decision in the entire programme.
When the state redirects that line to sports targeting the Olympics and the Asian Games, the money enters a different system, with different recipients and a different budget cycle. If football falls short two years later, reclaiming that line is not an administrative decision. It is a political fight with other federations, and football will lose it, because football has publicly declared it does not need the money.
The programme converts a soft dependency into a hard commitment.
And it does so precisely when cyclical risk is highest. Socialised revenue in Vietnamese football depends heavily on national-team results. A failed World Cup qualifying campaign, an early exit at an ASEAN Championship, a lost slot in a major tournament, can push a sponsorship renewal cycle back by two years. The current design removes the counter-cyclical buffer exactly when the buffer is most needed.
I understand the author's logic: financial independence is a strong message in an election. But voluntary financial independence differs from mandatory financial independence. The first is strategy. The second is a gamble.
THE GENUINE STRENGTH: AUDIT AND SUPERVISION
I have to say this part for fairness, because it is the only part of the programme I rate as above regional standard.
A commitment to audit by one of the Big Four accounting firms, with supervision by member organisations, is a real step forward. Most Southeast Asian football federations publish far less. Some do not publish audited financial statements to their own members at all.
If this commitment is executed, it creates something Vietnamese football has never had: a verifiable baseline. And once a baseline exists, every subsequent number is put on the scales.
That is why I reserve my scepticism for other sections and my respect for this one. Data gives me a body, but the match is what fills it with a soul. Audit is the body. Publishing it to members is the soul.
WHERE I MIGHT BE WRONG
At this point I have to argue against myself, because I learned something in 2026: a hot take only survives when a specific number travels with it, and an analysis is only worth trusting when the writer identifies where he is wrong.
First possibility. I may be judging a political document with an accounting ruler. If the real purpose of the 600 to 1,000 billion figure is to price a federation in the eyes of sponsors and delegates, then the absence of a denominator is not a technical flaw, it is the design. A round, memorable number that lands in a congress hall has more political value than a 40-page budget. In that case my critique is aimed at the wrong target.
Second possibility. I may be excessively sceptical about league expansion. 114,840 new player-minutes per season is an enormous volume of opportunity. If just 15 percent of those minutes go to under-23 players, we already have more than 17,000 top-flight minutes per year for the next generation. For a football economy where young players often wait until 23 or 24 for a starting place, that is a major shift. I may be demanding a perfect mechanism when what is needed is a sufficient shock.
Third possibility, and this is the most important one. Giving up the 80 billion VND may be the most progressive part of the programme rather than the most reckless. A football economy that has lived on state budget for thirty years has formed habits that are very hard to break: no need to sell, no need to look after fans, no need to be transparent. Cutting that source is the only way to force the system to learn how to earn.
I weigh all three seriously. And after weighing them, I keep my original position, for one reason only.
Southgate did not collapse, he buried himself with safety.
I wrote that in 2026, and I still believe it. A politically safe plan is a plan that puts forward the largest number it can say without being held accountable for the denominator. A safe plan is a plan that subsidises every club equally instead of setting conditions for the clubs that do things right. A safe plan is a plan that talks about expanding the league without talking about a youth quota.
If this programme were genuinely radical, it would have dared to write the hardest lines: a foreign-player quota, a minutes rule for under-21 players, club licensing conditions, and a current revenue table with an audit behind it. Those four lines cost far less than 600 billion VND. And those four lines would change Vietnamese football far more than 600 billion VND.
FALSIFIABLE PREDICTIONS
I do not write in the I-told-you-so register. I put my name on the table and let the results answer.
If Nguyen Duc Thuy is elected president of the Vietnam Football Federation for the 2026–2030 term, I offer three falsifiable predictions.
One: by December 2027, the federation's realised socialised revenue will be below 400 billion VND, meaning under two thirds of the floor of its own target. The reason I stake this claim is that there is no baseline, no contracted pipeline, and the two theoretically strongest revenue lines, media rights and digital content, are structurally fragmented.
Two: no youth quota clause and no under-21 minutes rule will be issued before the 2028 season. If expansion happens before that date without a minutes mechanism, the additional minutes will flow mainly to mid-tier foreign players and veteran domestic players, and we will have more matches without more players.
Three: the 80 billion VND of state budget will not return to football during the entire term, even in the event of a serious revenue shortfall. Money that has entered another system has no road back.
All three predictions are verifiable through public documents, and I will check them myself when the time comes.
What I want most from this programme sits somewhere else entirely. If the commitment to a Big Four audit and member-organisation supervision is executed, Vietnamese football will have a denominator for the first time. Once there is a denominator, every other number becomes meaningless unless it stands next to it. And once every number must stand next to it, promises of 1,000 billion VND will either correct themselves or expose themselves.
A football economy does not need more big numbers. It needs a denominator small enough to force everyone to be honest.
As for me, I will still be in the stands, counting the minutes of every 20-year-old, and writing them down. Because data is the only thing that does not lie, even when everyone else is making promises.
